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We generalize the canonical problem of Nash implementation by allowing agents
to voluntarily provide discriminatory signals, i.e., evidence. Evidence can either
take the form of hard information or, more generally, have differential but non-
prohibitivecostsindifferentstates. Insuchenvironments,socialchoicefunctions
that are not Maskin-monotonic can be implemented. We formulate a more gen-
eral property, evidence monotonicity, and show that this is a necessary condition
for implementation. Evidence monotonicity is also sufﬁcient for implementation
in economic environments. In some settings, such as when agents have small
preferences for honesty, any social choice function is evidence-monotonic. Addi-
tional characterizations are obtained for hard evidence. We discuss the relation-
ship between the implementation problem where evidence provision is voluntary
and a hypothetical problem where evidence can be chosen by the planner as part
of an extended outcome space.
Keywords. Mechanism design, costly signaling, veriﬁable information, Nash im-
plementation.
JEL classification. C72, D02, D71.
1. Introduction
A classic issue in mechanism design is that of (full) Nash implementation. The goal is to
design a mechanism such that in every state of the world, every Nash equilibrium out-
come of the game induced by the mechanism is desirable. A maintained assumption in
almost all of the literature following Maskin (1999; circulated in 1977) is that agents can
manipulate their information without restraint. Speciﬁcally, the set of messages that is
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available to an agent in a given mechanism is assumed to be state-independent; fur-
thermore, allmessagesareassumedtobecostless. Inthissense, allmessages are“cheap
talk”: they do not affect an agent’s payoff directly and matter only indirectly insofar as
they affect the outcome chosen by the mechanism.
Our goal is to focus attention on why this aspect of the implementation problem is
restrictive, andtogeneralizethesetofenvironmentstowhichthetheorycanbeapplied.
To motivate our treatment, here are three examples.
1. A principal wishes to divide a ﬁxed sum of money between agents as some func-
tion of their individual output. If asked only to send cheap-talk messages about
their output, agents could claim anything they want. But agents may also be able
to provide physical veriﬁcation or some other kind of certiﬁcation of their output.
An agent would be unable to certify that his output is greater than it in fact is, but
he could certify less, for example by simply not furnishing all of it. If it is costless
to provide such certiﬁcation, the setting is one of hard or veriﬁable information.
If instead agents bear costs as a function of how much output they carry to the
principal’s court (so to speak), but not how much they actually produced, then we
have a costly signaling instrument that combines hard information with “burning
money.” If the cost of certiﬁcation also depends on how much they actually pro-
duced, then a more complex signaling instrument is at hand.
2. A principal wants to hire the agent who has the highest ability and pay him a
wage equal to his marginal product. In addition to sending messages as requested
by the mechanism, agents have the choice to voluntarily acquire any amount of
education. Education is intrinsically useless, but the marginal cost depends on
an agent’s ability. This is an implementation version of the classical education-
signaling problem (Spence 1973).
3. When asked to report a direct message about the state, some agents may have a
(possibly small) degree of aversion to lying: they prefer to send a truthful message
about the state if it results in an outcome that is not much worse for them than
what could be obtained by lying. The extent of this aversion may be heterogenous
across agents.
Common to all these examples is that some messages or actions are only feasible
for an agent in some states of the world or have differential costs in different states. As
this naturally arises in numerous settings, it is important to study implementation in a
framework that accommodates this feature. While the issue has received some atten-
tion in the context of partial or weak implementation,1 it has received almost none in
treatments of full implementation, with exceptions that we discuss subsequently.
Accordingly, this paper adds evidence to an otherwise standard Nash-implemen-
tation environment. (Hereafter, we use the term “implementation” without qualiﬁca-
tion to mean full implementation in Nash equilibrium.) The deﬁning feature of a piece
1Thismeansthatoneisonlyconcernedwithensuringthatsome equilibriumoutcomeofthemechanism
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of evidence is that it is a discriminatory signal about the state of the world, as opposed
to a cheap-talk message. A mechanism not only relies on cheap-talk messages as usual,
but also on the proﬁle of evidence submitted by the players. Given the ability to com-
mit to a mechanism, a planner cannot do worse when evidence is available than when
it is not; our interest is to understand exactly when there is a strict beneﬁt and precisely
how much so. In particular, which social objectives are implementable given some evi-
dentiary structure, and what evidentiary structure is needed to make a particular social
objective implementable?
In Section 2, we formulate a fairly general problem of complete-information imple-
mentation with evidence.2 Each player i chooses which evidence to provide from some
feasible set, Ei. While our formal treatment is broader, assume for this Introduction that
at each state θ,p l a y e ri has preferences that are separable between the outcome chosen
by the planner—his outcome preference—and the evidence he submits. We posit that
submitting any evidence imposes a nonnegative cost on a player, but the magnitude of
the cost can depend on the evidence and the state of the world. Crucially, a player’s
choice of evidence is inalienable: a mechanism cannot force any player to submit any
particularpieceofevidence. Thisrendersafundamentaldistinctionbetweentheproﬁle
of submitted evidence and the outcome chosen by the planner.
We investigate when a social choice function (SCF) is Nash-implementable in this
setting, where the notion of implementation requires that no evidentiary costs be in-
curred on the equilibrium path.3 Without evidence, a SCF is implementable only if it is
Maskin-monotonic with respect to players’ outcome preferences (Maskin 1999). A sim-
ple but signiﬁcant observation is that this is no longer true once evidence is in the pic-
ture. Rather, what matters is preferences over the joint space of outcomes and evidence.
In Section 3, we identify a necessary condition for implementablity that we call evidence
monotonicity. This condition is weaker than Maskin monotonicity, and the two con-
ceptscoincideifandonlyifthereisnoevidence. Ourconditioncanberoughlydescribed
byconsideringahypotheticalproblemwhereinsteadofchoosinganoutcomeafterplay-
ers voluntarily submit evidence and cheap-talk messages, the planner instead chooses
bothanoutcomeandanevidenceproﬁleafterplayerssubmitonlycheap-talkmessages.
Loosely speaking, evidence monotonicity requires that one ﬁnds an augmented SCF on
this joint outcome-plus-evidence space that uses only costless evidence and is Maskin-
monotonic with respect to the players preferences on the joint space.
Viewed in this way, it is fairly intuitive why evidence monotonicity is necessary for
implementation. Weprovethatitisalsoalmostsufﬁcientinthesensethatanyevidence-
monotonic SCF can be implemented when there are three or more players and the en-
vironment is economic. An economic environment is one where in any state, given
any outcome, there are at least two players for whom this outcome is not top-ranked.
2Bycompleteinformation, we meanthatthestatethatis unknown to theplanneris common knowledge
among the agents, so that a mechanism induces a complete-information game in each state of the world.
3While a natural starting point, this is a substantive assumption. If one is willing to incur evidentiary
costs at equilibrium, then the scope for implementation generally is greater. Our sufﬁciency results may
be viewed as identifying conditions under which a SCF can be implemented without having to incur costly
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This sufﬁciency result is unexpected because the choice of what evidence to furnish is
inalienable or voluntary, whereas the intuition described above behind the evidence-
monotonicityconditionassumestheplannerhasthepowertochoosetheevidencepro-
ﬁle. Section 4 develops a “bridge” between the two problems.
The characterization of implementability in terms of evidence monotonicity has a
number of applications. In some problems, such as the benchmark education signaling
described earlier, natural SCF’s cannot be implemented because they are not evidence-
monotonic. Alternatively, under some evidentiary cost structures, every SCF becomes
evidence-monotonic. A striking case is when at least one player has a small preference
for honesty. Formally, this is captured by setting each player’s feasible set of evidence to
be Ei =  ,w h e r e  is the set of all possible states of the world. The assumption is that
an honest player suffers an arbitrarily small cost of submitting nontruthful evidence.
Our results imply that in such a setting with three or more players, any SCF can be im-
plemented in economic environments. Dutta and Sen (2011)a n dMatsushima (2008a,
2008b) ﬁnd related results, focussing speciﬁcally on preferences for honesty and with
some differences in formalization.
Section 5 specializes our general model to settings of hard or nonmanipulable ev-
idence: it is prohibitively costly for an agent to produce evidence that he does not in
fact possess. Formally, in each state θ,e a c ha g e n ti has a set of evidence, E 
i (θ) ⊆ Ei,
such that he can costlessly submit any ei ∈ E 
i (θ), but incurs such a large cost of sub-
mitting any ei / ∈ E 
i (θ) that the latter is strictly dominated. As we place no restriction
on the evidence structure, {E 
i (θ)}, the standard environment without evidence is a spe-
cial case where for all θ, E 
i (θ) = Ei for any player i. We deduce the implications of
evidence monotonicity in this setting of hard evidence. Of particular interest, we ﬁnd
that (i) when there are no outcome-preference reversals to exploit, evidence needs to
distinguish in an appropriate sense not only particular pairs of states, but moreover cer-
tain states from other sets of states or events, and (ii) some ability to reward agents for
providing evidence is necessary. Further insights are developed for the subclass of hard-
evidence problems that satisfy normality or full reports (Bull and Watson 2007, Lipman
and Seppi 1995), which can be interpreted as a “no time constraints” assumption on the
provision of evidence.
Before turning to a discussion of related literature, let us address one potential con-
cern that some readers may have: why study Nash implementation in a setting with
evidence when earlier work has already shown that quite permissive results can be ob-
tained without evidence either by using reﬁnements of Nash equilibrium (e.g., Moore
andRepullo1988, Jackson etal.1994)orfocussing onapproximate orvirtual implemen-
tation (Abreu and Sen 1991, Matsushima 1988)? There are at least three reasons. First,
our motivation is not merely to broaden the scope of what is implementable, but rather
to understand the role that evidence can play in implementation by studying such en-
vironments directly. It is natural to begin with the Nash benchmark, and indeed our
necessary conditions identify constraints on how evidence can be used. Second, theTheoretical Economics 7 (2012) Implementation with evidence 327
aforementioned permissive results without evidence are not without limits,4 and, third,
these results have been questioned from various perspectives.5
This paper contributes to the burgeoning literature on mechanism design with evi-
dence.6 Most of this literature concerns partial implementation with hard evidence. An
early reference is Green and Laffont (1986), and a sample of more recent work is Bull
and Watson (2004, 2007), Deneckere and Severinov (2008), Glazer and Rubinstein (2004,
2006), Sher (2010), and Singh and Wittman (2001). Bull (2008)a n dDeneckere and Sev-
erinov (2007) study partial implementation with costly evidence production.
In the full-implementation literature, there is a small set of papers that study feasi-
bleimplementation, wherethesetoffeasibleallocationsisunknown totheplanner. Itis
typicallyassumedthattheplannercanpartiallyverify players’claimsin particularways.
For example, in a Walrasian economy setting, Hurwicz et al. (1995)a n dPostlewaite and
Wettstein (1989) assume that a player can claim to have any subset of his true endow-
ment but not exaggerate; in a taxation problem with unknown incomes, Dagan et al.
(1999) make a similar assumption. In our model, the set of allocations is constant and
known to the planner; instead, it is the set of messages for players that either varies with
or has varying costs with the state.
Closest to our work is a recent paper by Ben-Porath and Lipman (2011), who also
tackle complete-information full implementation with evidence. While our results are
derived independently, we have beneﬁtted from reading their treatment. The motiva-
tions for their work and ours are similar—particularly with respect to advancing the
prior literature—but the analytical focus is quite different. The two most important dif-
ferencesarethat(i)ourpaperprovidesatreatmentofageneralcostlyevidenceprovision
setting, whereas they focus entirely on hard evidence, and (ii) we study Nash implemen-
tationthroughout,whereastheyfocusonsubgame-perfectimplementation.7 Moreover,
theirmain resultsrequirethattheplannercanaugmentmonetarytransfers offtheequi-
librium path; as mentioned earlier, we show that some ability to reward players is in fact
necessary to exploit hard evidence.
4For instance, none of them has bite when players’ outcome preferences do not vary across states,
whereas evidence can be extremely useful in this regard.
5A well known weakness of virtual implementation is that the mechanism may provide an outcome that
is arbitrarily inefﬁcient, unfair, or “far” from the desired outcome, even if this occurs only with small ex
ante probability. Implementation with reﬁnements of Nash equilibrium has recently been critiqued in
terms of robustness to the introduction of small amounts of incomplete information. In particular, if one
requires these mechanisms to implement in environments with “almost” complete information, Maskin
monotonicity is again a necessary condition (Chung and Ely 2003, Aghion et al. 2009).
6Beyond mechanism design, there are other literatures where evidence plays an important role. The in-
troduction of hard evidence into implementationmay be considered to be analogous to moving from com-
munication games of cheap talk (Crawford and Sobel 1982) to those of veriﬁable information (Grossman
1981, Milgrom 1981). Costlyevidenceproduction is studiedincommunication gamesby Kartik et al. (2007)
and Kartik (2009), in contract settings by, for example, Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995), and in legal set-
tings by, for example, Emons and Fluet (2009).
7Ben-Porath and Lipman’s Theorem 2, derived contemporaneously with our work, provides sufﬁcient
conditions for one-stage subgame-perfect implementation with hard evidence (hence, Nash implementa-
tion). Remark 3 in Section 5 provides a detailed comparison.328 Kartik and Tercieux Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
2. The model
There is a nonempty set of agents or players, I ={ 1     n}, a set of allocations or out-
comes, A,a n das e to fstates of the world,  . To avoid trivialities, |A| > 1 and | | > 1.T h e
state is common knowledge to the agents, but unknown to the planner. The planner’s
objectives are given by a social choice function (SCF), which is a function f :  → A.8 In
any state, agent i can produce a piece of evidence, ei ∈ Ei,w h e r eEi  = ∅ is i’s feasible
set of evidence. Let E := E1 ×···×En. Throughout, we use a subscript −i to denote all
players excluding i, so that, for example, E−i := ×j =iEj.
Agents are expected utility maximizers, and an agent i’s preferences are represented
by a von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function, Ui:A ×Ei ×  → R.H e r e ,Ui(a ei θ)
is agent i’s utility in state θ when the outcome is a and he submits evidence ei.9 We as-
sume that utilities are bounded in each state: for all i and θ, supa ei Ui(a ei θ)<∞ and
infa ei Ui(a ei θ)>−∞. We say that preferences are separable (between outcomes and
evidence)ifforall i thereisadecomposition Ui(a ei θ)= ui(a θ)−ci(ei θ).U n d e rs e p -
arability, ui(a θ) represents agent i’s preferences over outcomes and ci(ei θ)represents
the cost to agent i of evidence provision.
We wish to capture situations in which evidence submission is not intrinsically val-
ued by the agents or the planner. Let E 
i (θ a) := argmaxei Ui(a ei θ)be the set of least-
cost evidenceforaplayerigivenoutcomeaandstateθ. Weassumethatforeachplayeri,
outcome a,a n ds t a t eθ, E 
i (θ a)  = ∅.L e t E (θ a) := E 
1(θ a) ×···×E 
n(θ a),s ot h a t
given outcome a and state θ, any proﬁle of evidence in E (θ a) consists of each player
submitting some least-cost evidence. For short, we call e ∈ E (θ a) a costless evidence





i (θ a),becausesuchanei isa
least-costevidencefori nomatterthestateortheoutcome. Ifpreferencesareseparable,
we write E 
i (θ) := argminei ci(ei θ).
In standard Nash-implementation theory, a mechanism consists of a (cheap-talk)
message space and an outcome function that speciﬁes an outcome for every proﬁle of
messages. In the current setting, a mechanism can also take advantage of the evidence
that players submit. Formally, a mechanism is a pair (M g),w h e r eM = M1 ×···×Mn is
a message space and g:M ×E → A is an outcome function that speciﬁes an outcome for
every proﬁle of messages and evidence.
A mechanism (M g) induces a strategic-form game in each state of the world,
θ, where a pure strategy for player i is (mi ei) ∈ Mi × Ei and a pure-strategy proﬁle
(m e) := (mi ei)n
i=1 yieldsapayoffUi(g(m e) ei θ)toplayeri.L e tN E (M g θ)betheset
of pure-strategy Nash equilibria (NE, hereafter) of the mechanism (M g) in state θ.F o r
expositional simplicity, we restrict attention to pure-strategy equilibria; our results can
be extended to mixed-strategy equilibria as discussed in Remark 1 following Theorem 2.
8Our results readily generalize to social choice correspondences at the cost of additional notation.
9It is common to focus on just ordinal preferences in each state. This approach sufﬁces insofar as only
pure-strategy Nash equilibria are considered, but our formulation allows us to subsume mixed Nash equi-
libria as well (see Remark 1). In addition, our formulation also allows for the view that utility functions
contain cardinal information, and hence, allows for cardinally based social choice functions (such as utili-
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Since the planner’s objective, represented by the SCF, speciﬁes only an outcome for
each state, a deﬁnition of implementation must take a stance on what proﬁles of evi-
dence are acceptable to the planner. We adopt the following notion.
Definition 1 (Implementation). A mechanism (M g) implements the SCF f if
(i) ∀θ:f(θ)={ a:a = g(m e) for some (m e) ∈ NE(M g θ)} and
(ii) (m e) ∈ NE(M g θ) ⇒ e ∈ E (θ f(θ)).
A SCF is implementable if there is a mechanism that implements it.
We now comment on a number of aspects of the model.
1. One can think of any ei as a document, physical object, verbal claim, or action that
agent i can submit, provide, or take. What is crucial is that the decision of which
evidence to submit is a player’s private decision as in Myerson (1982) and cannot
be coerced by the planner at any point. In this sense, following Bull and Watson’s
(2007) terminology, we view evidence as inalienable. This renders a fundamental
distinctionbetweentheoutcomespace,A,whichfallsundertheplanner’spurview,
and the evidence proﬁle space, E, which does not.
2. The present framework nests the standard model without evidence as a special
case: it arises when all evidence for every player is cheap-talk evidence, in which
case preferences are separable and one can set ci(ei θ)= 0 for all i, ei,a n dθ. Note
that the second part of Deﬁnition 1 is trivially satisﬁed in this case, because for
any a and θ, E (θ a) = E. Hence, without evidence, our notion of implementation
reduces to the standard notion.
3. More generally, part (ii) of Deﬁnition 1 requires that only costless evidence proﬁles
must be sent in any equilibrium of an implementing mechanism. Given our mo-
tivation that evidence is not intrinsically valued by the planner or the players, the
interpretation is that an implementing mechanism should not lead to any (Pareto)
inefﬁcientevidenceproduction. Thisisanaturalbenchmark,althoughnottheonly
reasonable one, as discussed in the conclusion.
4. We assume that a player’s preferences depend only on the evidence he provides,
but not on the evidence submitted by other players. While this is obviously appro-
priate in many situations, there may be some applications where it is restrictive,
i.e., where a player’s evidence submission has a direct externality on other players.
We leave such cases to future research.
5. Consider settings with separable preferences. The framework allows for the possi-
bility that two distinct states are identical in terms of all players’ preferences over
outcomes. In traditional implementation theory, it is common to equate states
with proﬁles of preferences, because in the absence of evidence, it is impossible
to implement different outcomes in two states that do not differ in players’ (out-
come)preferences. We shall see that this is no longer the case once evidence is330 Kartik and Tercieux Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
available. As emphasized by Ben-Porath and Lipman (2011), in many applications,
such as contract and legal settings, a planner may wish to condition the outcome
on the state even though players’ preferences over outcomes are entirely state-
independent.10
6. Each player’s feasible set of evidence, Ei, is assumed to be nonempty. This is
without loss of generality, because we can always endow a player who has no evi-
dence with some cheap-talk evidence, since the planner can require submission of
a cheap-talk message.
7. Itisalsowithoutlossofgeneralitythateachplayermustsubmitexactlyonepieceof
evidence. If one wants to allow a player to submit zero or no evidence, this just re-
quireslabelingaparticularpieceofevidenceas“noevidence.” Ifonewantstoallow
a player to submit multiple pieces of evidence, this just requires adding the appro-
priate conjunctions of underlying evidence. On the other hand, in particular ap-
plications, it may be reasonable that submitting no evidence is either not allowed
or at least is not costless, and similarly that submitting multiple pieces of evidence
imposes higher (possibly prohibitive) costs; we provide some examples later.
8. Our formulation of a mechanism is inherently static since we are considering the
strategic-form game it induces in each state. Given the focus on Nash equilib-
rium, our results would not change if we were to consider dynamic mechanisms.11
Furthermore, while our formulation considers only deterministic mechanisms,
stochastic mechanisms can be encompassed by viewing A as a lottery space.
9. Finally, we do not allow the planner to prohibit or forbid players from submitting
some pieces of evidence. This squares well with the view that a player’s choice of
evidence is inalienable. In any case, our results would not change even if a planner
c o u l df o r b i ds o m ee v i d e n c e . 12
10. An important special case of our model is when any piece of evidence is either
costless or prohibitively costly.
Definition 2 (Hard evidence). The setting is of hard evidence if preferences are sepa-
rable and for all i, θ,a n dei,e i t h e rci(ei θ)= 0 or ci(ei θ)>supaui(a θ)−infaui(a θ).
Inasettingwithhardevidence, submittingany e 
i ∈ E 
i (θ) strictlydominatessubmit-
ting any ei / ∈ E 
i (θ) for player i at state θ because the latter’s cost strictly outweighs any
10Formally, in a separable setting, preferences over outcomes are state-independent if ∀i ∈ I, ∀θ θ  ∈  ,
∀a b ∈ A, ui(a θ) ≥ ui(b θ)  ⇒ ui(a θ ) ≥ ui(b θ ).
11More precisely, the sufﬁcient conditions we provide for implementation would obviously also remain
sufﬁcient; the necessary condition remains necessary as long as one allows only dynamic mechanisms
that do not indirectly change the evidence structure, such as by allowing multiple instances of evidence
submission or randomizing over what evidence to request. See also footnote 14.
12The sufﬁcient conditions for implementation obviously remain sufﬁcient; one can show also that our
necessary condition remains necessary. Alternatively, in cases where our sufﬁcient conditions fail, imple-
mentationmaybepossiblewhentheplannercanforbidsomeevidencebutnotwhenhecannot; interested
readers are referred to earlier versions of this paper for an example.Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) Implementation with evidence 331
possible utility gain from inducing a preferred outcome. Thus, by submitting ei,p l a y e ri
effectively proves that the state is in the set {θ:ei ∈ E 
i (θ)}.13 This justiﬁes why such a
setting is one of hard evidence, which is also referred to sometimes as certiﬁability, ver-
iﬁability, or partial provability.14 Note that the standard environment without evidence
is in fact a special case of a hard-evidence setting, where for any i, E 
i (θ) = Ei for all θ.
3. General results
Maskin (1999) shows that in a setting without evidence—which can be represented in
ourframeworkasasettingwhereallevidenceischeap-talkevidenceandpreferencesare
separable—a SCF must satisfy a monotonicity condition with respect to players’ prefer-
ences over outcomes to be implementable. We refer to his condition as Maskin mono-
tonicity, which can be stated as follows whenever preferences in the current context are
separable:
Definition 3 (Maskin monotonicity). Assume separablepreferences. ASCF is Maskin-
monotonic provided that for all θ and θ ,i f
∀i a:
 
ui(f(θ) θ) ≥ ui(a θ)  ⇒ ui(f(θ) θ ) ≥ ui(a θ )
 
  (1)
then f(θ)= f(θ ).
When evidence is available, Maskin monotonicity is not necessary for implementa-
tion, as illustrated starkly in the following example.
Example 1. Assume separable preferences and suppose E1 =   with
c1(θ θ ) =
 
0 if θ = θ 
k if θ  = θ ,
where k>supa θu1(a θ)−infa θu1(a θ). Thiscanbeinterpretedasplayer1neverbeing
willing to misrepresent the state of the world. Trivially then, regardless of the agents’
preferences over outcomes, any SCF f can be implemented by a mechanism with an
arbitrary message space, M, and outcome function g(m (e1     en)) = f(e1). ♦
13WhileDeﬁnition2assumesseparability,thereisessentiallynolossofgenerality. Considerthefollowing
deﬁnition that does not assume separability: for all i, θ, and ei,e i t h e r( a )ei ∈
 
a E 
i (θ a) or (b) ∃e 
i such
that ∀a b:Ui(a e 
i θ)>Ui(b ei θ). This deﬁnition clearly subsumes Deﬁnition 2. Moreover, if preferences
satisfy this condition, then it is strictly dominated at state θ for player i to submit any ei / ∈
 
aE 
i (θ a).T h e
setting is then effectively identical to one where preferences are separable, and at any state θ,p l a y e ri has a
cost ci(ei θ)= 0 if ei ∈
 
aE 
i (θ a) and a cost ci(ei θ)>supa ui(a θ)−infaui(a θ) otherwise.
14Contrary toour treatment,modelsof hardevidenceoftenassumethatnoncostlessevidenceis actually
unavailable, rather than feasible but prohibitively costly to produce. Given our focus in this paper on static
mechanisms, the two approaches are equivalent. More generally, however, there are some differences: for
example, dynamic mechanisms can sometimes help (even without using randomization and requesting
onlythateachplayersubmitevidenceonce)whensomeevidenceisinfeasibleratherthanjustprohibitively
costly to produce. Interestedreaders should consult previous versions of this paper for details; see also Bull
and Watson (2007) for a partial-implementation context.332 Kartik and Tercieux Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
The key to our analysis is identifying the appropriate notion of monotonicity in the
present setting, which we call evidence monotonicity.
Definition 4 (Evidence monotonicity). A SCF f is evidence-monotonic if there exists
e∗:  → E such that
(i) for all θ, e∗(θ) ∈ E (θ f(θ)) and
(ii) for all θ and θ ,i f




i (θ) θ) ≥ Ui(a e 
i θ)⇒ Ui(f(θ) e∗




then f(θ)= f(θ ).
Inwords, aSCFisevidence-monotonicifthereis afunction e∗ thatassigns acostless
proﬁleofevidencetoeachstatesuchthatifnoplayerhasa“preferencereversal”withre-
spect to the outcome and his component of e∗ when the state changes from θ to θ ,t h e n
f(θ)= f(θ ). Intuitively, one should think of e∗(·) a st h ee v i d e n c ep r o ﬁ l et h a ti ss u b m i t -
ted to an implementing mechanism. The existential quantiﬁer on e∗(·) is unavoidable:
it stems from the fact that the planner does not intrinsically care about which evidence
proﬁle is submitted. We show later that in a special but important class of problems,
verifying the deﬁnition can be simpliﬁed. Notice that the second part of Deﬁnition 4
bears a resemblance to how one would view Maskin monotonicity on an extended out-
come space, A × E, if the planner could somehow choose evidence proﬁles in addition
to choosing outcomes. We clarify the connection in Section 4.
In settings with separable preferences, evidence monotonicity is a weaker require-
ment than Maskin monotonicity, with the two concepts being equivalent when all evi-
dence is cheap talk. A formal statement follows.
Proposition 1. Assume separable preferences. (i) Any Maskin-monotonic SCF is
evidence-monotonic. (ii) If all evidence is cheap-talk evidence, then any evidence-
monotonic SCF is Maskin-monotonic.
Proof. For the ﬁrst statement, assume f is Maskin-monotonic. Let e∗ be any function
such that for all θ, e∗(θ) ∈ E (θ f(θ)).F i xa n yθ and θ , and assume (2). We must show
that f(θ)= f(θ ). Separability and (2) imply that for all i, a,a n de 
i,










i (θ) θ )
 
 
By taking e 
i = e∗
i (θ) for all i above and applying Maskin monotonicity, it follows that
f(θ)= f(θ ).T h u s ,f is evidence-monotonic.
For the second statement, notice that when all evidence is cheap-talk evidence and
preferences are separable, (2) reduces to (1).  
A striking observation is that even small evidentiary costs can create a substantial
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arises when players have small preferences for honesty, as mentioned in the third moti-
vating example of the Introduction. The following generalization of Example 1 demon-
strates the point.
Example 2. Consider a setting where players have a small preference for honesty when
asked to report a direct message about the state. Formally, assume separable prefer-
ences and suppose that for each i, Ei =   and the cost function is given by
ci(θ θ ) =
 
0 if θ = θ 
ε if θ  = θ ,
where ε>0 can be arbitrarily small.
This structure implies that for any i, θ,a n da, E 
i (θ a) ={ θ}.H e n c e ,f o ra n ya and θ,
E (θ a) ={ (θ     θ)}.L e te∗(θ) = (θ     θ)for all θ.O b s e r v et h a tf o ra n yθ and θ   = θ,
(2) is false: consider a = f(θ)and e 
i = θ . Thus, any SCF is evidence-monotonic.
In fact, it is not necessary that all players have such a preference for honesty, only
that in each state there be some player who does (the identity of the player could vary
with the state).15 ♦
Our ﬁrst main result is that only evidence-monotonic SCFs are implementable.
Theorem 1. If f is implementable, then f is evidence-monotonic.
Proof. Assumef isimplementableandpickanymechanism(M g)thatimplementsf.
For each θ,t h e r ee x i s t s(m(θ) e(θ)) ∈ M × E (θ f(θ)) that is a Nash equilibrium at
θ such that g(m(θ) e(θ)) = f(θ).F o r e a c h θ,s e te∗(θ) := e(θ). We show that this
choice veriﬁes Deﬁnition 4. Part (i) of the deﬁnition is obviously satisﬁed, so con-
sider part (ii). Pick any θ and θ , and assume that (2)i ss a t i s ﬁ e d . L e tm be such that
(m e∗(θ)) ∈ NE(M g θ)and ﬁx any i. By the optimality of i’s strategy,
Ui(f(θ) e∗





for any (m 
i e 
i) ∈ Mi ×Ei.B y( 2),
Ui(f(θ) e∗





for any (m 
i e 
i) ∈ Mi ×Ei.
Consequently, (m e∗(θ)) ∈ NE(M g θ ).H e n c e , f(θ)= g(m e∗(θ)) = f(θ ),a sr e -
quired.  
To illustrate how Theorem 1 has bite, we return to the second motivating example in
the Introduction about education signaling.
15It is without loss of generality to assume that the planner knows the identity of the player with pref-
erences for honesty in any state: if the planner has uncertainty about which player it is, this requires only
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Example 3. There are n workers, each with an ability level that measures his marginal
productivity. The state of the world is a vector of abilities. There is one job that must
be allocated to a single worker along with a wage, so that A ={ 1     n}×R+.T h eS C F
is f(θ)= (i∗(θ) θi∗(θ)),w h e r ei∗(θ) = max(argmaxiθi), i.e., the goal is to allocate the job
to the most able worker and pay him his marginal product (ties in ability are broken in
favor of workers with higher indices, which is convenient but inessential). Suppose that
workers can signal their ability through a choice ei of education, so that the evidence
for i is ei ∈ R+. Workers’ preferences are separable, and any worker i’s utility from an
outcome a = (a1 a2) is state-independent, while his cost of education depends only on
his own ability; hence, we can write Ui(a ei θ)= ui(a) − ci(ei θi). Assume the cost of
education satisﬁes two reasonable properties: for all i and θi, ci(ei θi) = 0 if ei = 0;f o r
all i, ci(ei θi) is strictly increasing in ei and strictly decreasing in θi.
Then for any i and θ, E 
i (θ) ={ 0}, and it follows that the only candidate to verify ev-
idence monotonicity according to Deﬁnition 4 is e∗(θ) = (0     0).I ti se a s i l yc h e c k e d
that (2) is satisﬁed for any θ  ≤ θ, in the sense of usual vector order.16 Since θ  ≤ θ does
not imply f(θ ) = f(θ), f is not evidence-monotonic and, by Theorem 1,i sn o ti m p l e -
mentable. ♦
While evidence monotonicity is necessary for implementation, it is not sufﬁcient.
Rather than pursuing an exhaustive characterization, we ﬁrst tackle sufﬁciency in eco-
nomic environments.
Definition 5 (Economic environment). The environment is economic if there is no
stateθ,outcomea,andevidenceproﬁleesuchthat|{i:(a ei) ∈ argmaxb e 
i Ui(b e 
i θ)}| ≥
n−1.
In other words, an environment is economic if in any state, given any outcome and
evidence–proﬁle pair (a e), there are at least two players for each of whom (a ei) is not
top-ranked. Various versions of such a domain restriction are used in the implementa-
tion literature. Deﬁnition 5 is identical to a condition in Bergemann and Morris (2008)
that has the same name, as long as one views their condition on an extended outcome
space A × E; under separable preferences, it is equivalent to Bergemann and Morris’
(2008) condition viewed on the outcome space A alone, because in this case our condi-
tion simpliﬁes to requiring that for any θ and a, |{i:a ∈ argmaxbui(b θ)}| <n−1.
To understand the scope of economic environments, focus on settings with three
or more agents. An environment is economic if there is a divisible private good that is
positively valued by all agents. In particular, the environment is economic if the planner
16In this example, using e∗(θ) = (0     0) for each θ,( 2) reduces to
∀i a e 
i :
 
ui(f(θ)) ≥ ui(a)−ci(e 





which is equivalent to









which is true for any θ  ≤ θ because then ci(e 
i θ 
i) ≥ ci(e 
i θi) for any i, e 
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can augment an underlying outcome space with arbitrarily small transfers, even with a
requirement of budget balance (cf. Benoît and Ok 2008, Ben-Porath and Lipman 2011,
Sanver 2006).17 Even without private goods or transfers, an environment is economic as
longasthereisenoughdisagreementamongagentsabouttheirmostpreferredoutcome
in any state.
Theorem 2. Assume n ≥ 3 and an economic environment. If f is evidence-monotonic,
then f is implementable.
The proof of Theorem 2 is by construction of a canonical mechanism that is familiar
from existing mechanisms in the literature, but is modiﬁed appropriately to deal with
evidence.
Proof of Theorem 2. Since f is evidence-monotonic, let e∗ be the function that veri-
ﬁes Deﬁnition 4.F o ra l li,s e tMi =  ×A×N.D e ﬁ n eg(m e) according to the following
rules.
Rule 1. If m1 =···=mn = (θ f(θ) k) and e = e∗(θ),t h e ng(m e)= f(θ).
Rule 2. If ∃i such that (i) for all j  = i, mj = (θ f(θ) k) and ej = e∗
j(θ), and (ii) either
mi = (˜ θ a l)  = (θ f(θ) k) or ei  = e∗
i (θ), then there are two alternatives.
(a) If Ui(f(θ) e∗
i (θ) θ) ≥ Ui(a ei θ),t h e ng(m e)= a.
(b) If Ui(f(θ) e∗
i (θ) θ) < Ui(a ei θ),t h e ng(m e)= f(θ).
Rule 3. For any other (m e), letting mi = (θi ai ki) and i∗ = minargmaxi∈I ki,t h e n
g(m e)= ai∗.
Step 1. It is routine to verify that for any θ, there is a “truthful” NE, where for some
k ∈ N,e a c ha g e n ti plays mi = (θ f(θ) k) and ei = e∗
i (θ). This NE results in outcome
f(θ)and, moreover, e clearly belongs to E (θ f(θ)).
Fortheremainderoftheproof,assumethatthetruestateisθ  andthat(m e)isaNE.
Step 2. Weshowthat(m e) cannot fall into Rule 2. Suppose, to the contrary, that (m e)
is such an equilibrium. Then it must be that for all j  = i (where i is deﬁned in Rule 2),
17To be more precise, assume n ≥ 3, assume separable preferences (for simplicity), and consider an
underlying outcome space, ˜ A, with each agent having a utility function ˜ ui : ˜ A ×   → R.N o t e t h a t˜ A
itself may include transfers or private goods, but need not. Fix some SCF ˜ f :  → ˜ A. Now suppose
the planner can impose an additional vector of transfers (t1     tn) ∈ X ⊆ Rn and that each agent val-
ues his personal transfer quasilinearly. Assume the space of possible transfers satisﬁes two mild proper-
ties: (0     0) ∈ X and, for all (t1     tn) ∈ X,t h e r ee x i s t s(˜ t1     ˜ tn) ∈ X and i  = j such that ˜ ti >t i and
˜ tj >t j.A no b v i o u se x a m p l ei sX ={ (t1     ti     tn) ∈ Rn:
 
j tj = 0 |ti|≤k} for some k>0, i.e., the plan-
ner must balance his budget and cannot reward or punish any player by more than k utility units. We
can then deﬁne an augmented outcome space A = ˜ A × X, an augmented utility function for each agent
ui :A×  → R,w h e r eui(˜ a t1     tn θ)= ui(˜ a θ)+ti, and an augmented SCF f :  → A derived from ˜ f by
setting f(θ)= ( ˜ f(θ) 0     0). This augmented environment satisﬁes Deﬁnition 5.336 Kartik and Tercieux Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
(g(m e) ej) ∈ argmaxb e 
j Uj(b e 
j θ ): otherwise, one of these n − 1 players, say j∗,c a n
proﬁtably deviate into Rule 3, submitting some e 
j∗ and requesting and receiving some
b such that Uj∗(b e 
j∗ θ )>U j∗(g(m e) ej∗ θ ). But this contradicts the environment
being economic. A similar argument applies to show that no equilibrium (m e) can fall
into Rule 3.
Step3. Itremainstoconsiderthecasewhere(m e)fallsintoRule1,sothate = e∗(θ)for
some θ.H e r e ,g(m e) = f(θ). Rule 2 must hold since a player i can always deviate into
Rule 2(a) by producing evidence e 
i and get any outcome a such that Ui(f(θ) e∗
i (θ) θ) ≥
Ui(a e 
i θ). Thus, evidence monotonicity implies that f(θ)= f(θ ). Finally, since any
player can deviate to Rule 2(a) and get the same outcome f(θ ) while submitting some
evidence in E 
i (θ  f(θ )), the hypothesis that (m e) is a Nash equilibrium implies that
e ∈ E (θ  f(θ )).  
Remark 1. The mechanism used in the proof of Theorem 2 does not work when mixed
Nash equilibria are considered. Arguments analogous to those that deal with mixed
strategies in standard settings without evidence (e.g., Kartik and Tercieux 2012, Maskin
and Sjöström 2002, Section 4.3) can be adapted to extend Theorem 2 to mixed Nash
equilibria.
Remark 2. Theorem 2 concerns three or more agents. When there are only two agents,
the economic environment condition is rather stringent. For n = 2, evidence mono-
tonicity can be shown to be sufﬁcient for implementation under a less demanding ver-
sion of economic environments in conjunction with Moore and Repullo’s (1990) bad
outcome condition.
To illustrate how Theorem 2 is useful, we apply it to a setting where players have
(possibly small) preferences for honesty.
Corollary 1. Assume n ≥ 3 and that the environment is economic. If in each state, at
least one player has a preference for honesty as formalized in Example 2,t h e na n yS C Fi s
implementable.
Proof.A ss h o w ni nExample 2, any SCF is evidence-monotonic when at least one
player has a preference for honesty. Thus, Corollary 1 is a direct implication of Theo-
rem 2.  
There is a growing literature on implementation when players have preferences for
honesty. Matsushima (2008a, 2008b) was the ﬁrst to investigate such a question and
obtain permissive results in related, but not identical, settings. More similar to Corol-
lary 1 is a contemporaneous ﬁnding of Dutta and Sen (2011). Because their paper is
entirely about implementation with preferences for honesty, their main result is slightly
strongerthanCorollary1andtheirproofusesaremarkablysimpleimplementingmech-
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preference for honesty produces permissive results is that it renders any SCF evidence-
monotonic.
We now discuss the role of the economic environment assumption in Theorem 2.I n
an economic environment, any SCF trivially satisﬁes the following version of Maskin’s
(1999) no veto power condition.
Definition 6( N ov e t op o w e r ) . AS C Ff satisﬁes no veto power provided that for all θ,
if (a e) is such that
 
   
 
i : (a ei) ∈ argmax
a  e 
i
Ui(a  e 
i θ)
  
    ≥ n−1,t h e na = f(θ) 
In other words, if at any state, there is some outcome and evidence–proﬁle pair that
is top-ranked by at least n − 1 players, then the outcome must be chosen by the SCF
at that state. Plainly, when preferences are separable—a fortiori, when all evidence is
cheap-talkevidence—theabovedeﬁnitionreducestothestandardnovetopowercondi-
tion. In a setting without evidence, Maskin (1999) shows that no veto power is sufﬁcient
toensurethatMaskin-monotonicSCF’sareimplementable,given n ≥ 3. Thismightsug-
gest that Theorem 2 could be strengthened by assuming only no veto power rather than
an economic environment. The following counterexample proves otherwise.
Example 4. Suppose n = 3,   ={ X Y},a n dA ={ b c d1 d2 d3}. Only player 1 has
non-cheap-talk evidence, so we ignore the evidence of player 2 and 3. Let E1 = E =
{x y}. All players have separable preferences. Using the standard notation of   for strict
preference, player 3’s preferences over outcomes are given by
X : b ≺ c ≺ d1 ≺ d2 ≺ d3
.
Y : c   b   d1   d2   d3
Player 2’s preferences over outcomes are given by
X : b ≺ c ≺ d1 ≺ d3 ≺ d2
.
Y : c   b   d1   d3   d2
Player 1’s preferences over outcome–evidence pairs are given by
X : b y ≺ c y ≺ b x ≺ c x≺ d3 y≺ d3 x≺ d2 y≺ d2 x≺ d1 y≺ d1 x
.
Y : c x  c y   b x   b y   d3 x  d3 y  d2 x  d2 y  d1 x  d1 y
Itcanbecheckedthatplayer1’spreferencesareseparablewithE 
1(X) = E 
1(Y) ={ x}.
The important point to note is that in state X, the cost for player 1 to produce evidence
y outweighs her preference for outcome c over b, whereas in state Y, the outcome pref-
erence for c over b outweighs the cost of producing evidence y.
Consider the SCF f,w h e r ef(X)= b and f(Y)= c. The following observations
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(i) No veto power is satisﬁed, because in state X there is no outcome that is most
preferred by any two players, whereas in state Y, all players unanimously prefer
outcome c over any other and f(Y)= c. The latter point shows that the environ-
ment is not economic.
(ii) SCF f is evidence-monotonic; this can be veriﬁed by using e∗
1(X) = e∗
1(Y) = x in
Deﬁnition 4.
(iii) SCF f is not implementable. Suppose, to the contrary, that it is implementable
by a mechanism (M g). Then there is a message proﬁle m such that g(m x) = b
and (m x) is a Nash equilibrium at X. Since b is bottom-ranked by players 2
and 3 at state X, any unilateral deviation by either player 2 or 3 must not change
the outcome. Moreover, if player 1 deviates by sending some cheap-talk message
together with evidence x, this cannot induce outcome c; otherwise, this would
constitute a proﬁtable deviation for him at state X. Since f(Y)= c, (m x) cannot
be a Nash equilibrium at Y, hence player 1 must have a unilateral deviation from
(m x) by submitting evidence y with some cheap-talk message to induce out-
comec. Lettheresultingmessageproﬁleandevidencebe(m  y).B u tt h e n(m  y)
is a Nash equilibrium at state Y, because outcome c is top-ranked by players 2
and 3, and no unilateral deviation of player 1 can induce (c x). Since y/ ∈ E 
1(Y),
we contradict the assumption that f is implemented by (M g). ♦
Therefore, in a general evidentiary setting, evidence monotonicity, no veto power,
and n ≥ 3 do not guarantee that a SCF is implementable (even if one assumes separable
preferences). However, these conditions are sufﬁcient in settings of hard evidence:
Theorem3. Assumen ≥ 3andasettingofhardevidence. Iff isevidence-monotonicand
satisﬁes no veto power, then f is implementable.
Proof. Consider the proof of Theorem 2 and the mechanism constructed therein. The
economic environment condition was used only in Step 2 of the argument, so it suf-
ﬁces here to deal with equilibria that fall into Rule 2 or Rule 3 of the mechanism. Sup-
pose the true state is θ  and there is an equilibrium (m e) that falls into Rule 2 of the
mechanism. It must be that for all j  = i (where i is deﬁned in Rule 2), (g(m e) ej) ∈
argmaxb e 
j Uj(b e 
j θ ): otherwise, one of these n − 1 players, say j∗, can proﬁtably de-
viate into Rule 3, submitting some e 
j∗ and requesting and receiving some b such that
Uj∗(b e 
j∗ θ )>U j∗(g(m e) ej∗ θ ). No veto power now implies g(m e) = f(θ ).M o r e -
over, for every player k,w em u s th a v eek ∈ E 
k(θ ),18 since in a hard-evidence setting
it is strictly dominated for k to submit any ek / ∈ E 
k(θ ). Therefore, g(m e) = f(θ ) and
e ∈ E (θ ), as required. A similar argument applies if (m e) falls into Rule 3.  
Beyond its intrinsic interest, Theorem 3 also serves as a strict generalization of
Maskin’s (1999) classic sufﬁciency result, because the traditional environment without
evidence is a special case of a hard-evidence setting where for any i, E 
i (θ) = Ei for all θ.
18This notation uses the fact that a hard-evidence setting is separable.Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) Implementation with evidence 339
4. Inalienable and alienable evidence
As already noted, an important feature of the current implementation exercise is that
evidence is inalienable, i.e., a player’s evidentiary choice is his private domain. It is of
interest to understand how constrained the planner is by evidence inalienability. To this
end, consider a hypothetical problem where the planner can in fact choose the proﬁle
of evidence along with the outcome, i.e., evidence becomes alienable. Formally, de-
ﬁne an extended outcome space ˆ A := A × E and say that a correspondence ˆ f :  ⇒ ˆ A
is an extension of a SCF f :  → A if there exists a correspondence ˆ e:  ⇒ E such that
ˆ f = (f  ˆ e), by which we mean that for all θ, ˆ f(θ)={ (a e):a = f(θ) e∈ ˆ e(θ)}.T h er e a s o n
to consider extensions of f that are correspondences even though f is a function is clar-
iﬁed shortly. Say that ˆ f is a costless extension of f if ˆ f = (f  ˆ e) for some correspondence ˆ e
such that for all θ, ˆ e(θ) ⊆ E (θ f(θ)).
If evidence were alienable, then the planner would face a standard implementa-
tion problem on the extended outcome space, hence Maskin monotonicity of an ex-
tended social choice rule would be a necessary and almost sufﬁcient condition for its
implementation.19 Theorems 1 and 2 establish that with inalienable evidence, evidence
monotonicity is necessary and, under some other conditions, also sufﬁcient for imple-
mentation. We now derive a close relationship between evidence monotonicity in the
underlying problem and Maskin monotonicity on the extended outcome space.
Theorem 4. A SCF is evidence-monotonic if and only if it has a costless extension that is
Maskin-monotonic on the extended outcome space.
See the Appendix for the proof for Theorem 4, as well as proofs for Propositions 2
and 3 that appear below.
TheequivalenceinTheorem4requiresallowingcostlessextensionstobecorrespon-
dences; speciﬁcally, the “only if” direction would fail if one restricts attention to costless
extensions that are single-valued.20 Theorem 4 provides the foundation for a “bridge”
betweenourimplementationproblemwithinalienableevidenceandahypotheticalim-
plementation problem with alienable evidence. In particular, we can state the following
corollary.
19Anextendedsocialchoice rule ˆ f :  ⇒ ˆ A isMaskin-monotonicprovidedthatfor all θ, (a e) ∈ ˆ f(θ), and
θ ,i f
∀i b e 
i :[Ui(a ei θ)≥ Ui(b e 
i θ) ⇒ Ui(a ei θ ) ≥ Ui(b e 
i θ )] 
then (a e) ∈ ˆ f(θ ).
20Here is an example. Let   ={ θ1 θ2 θ3},l e tn = 1, and let the setting be of separable preferences. Let
E1 ={ x y},w i t hE 
1(θ1) ={ x}, E 
1(θ2) ={ y}, and E 
1(θ3) ={ x y}. The agent’s outcome preferences are state-
independent, with outcome a always being his most preferred outcome. The SCF f is given by f(θ)= a
for all θ. This SCF is evidence-monotonic because Deﬁnition 4 is veriﬁed by any e∗(·) such that for all θ,
e∗(θ) ∈ E 
1(θ). However, any single-valued costless extension of the SCF, say ˆ f, is not Maskin-monotonic
on the extended outcome space: since both ˆ f(θ1) = (a x) and ˆ f(θ2) = (a y) maximize the agent’s utility
in state θ3, Maskin monotonicity requires that ˆ f(θ1) ∈ ˆ f(θ3) and also ˆ f(θ2) ∈ ˆ f(θ3), which is not possible
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Corollary 2. Assume n ≥ 3 and an economic environment. Then any SCF f is im-
plementable (with inalienable evidence) if and only if a costless extension of f is imple-
mentable with alienable evidence on the extended outcome space.
Proof. Assume n ≥ 3 and an economic environment. By Theorems 1 and 2,aS C Ff is
implementableifandonlyifitisevidence-monotonic. Ontheotherhand,anyextension
of f trivially satisﬁes standard no veto power on the extended outcome space,21 hence
is implementable with alienable evidence if and only if it is Maskin-monotonic on the
extended outcome space. The conclusion now follows from Theorem 4.  
For economic environments with at least three agents, we therefore have an equiv-
alence between implementation with inalienable evidence and implementation with
alienable evidence. The “only if” direction of Corollary 2 is intuitive, as inalienability
can only make implementation harder than if evidence were alienable. Indeed, this
direction of the equivalence does not depend on having n ≥ 3 or an economic envi-
ronment, because of the following logic: suppose (M g) is a mechanism that imple-
mentsf.D e ﬁ n e ˆ M by ˆ Mi = Mi×Ei forallianddeﬁne ˆ g: ˆ M → ˆ Aby ˆ g(m e)= (g(m e) e)
for all (m e). Then, on the extended outcome space, ( ˆ M  ˆ g) achieves standard imple-
mentation of the costless extension of f given by ˆ f = (f  ˆ e), where for all θ, ˆ e(θ) :=
{e ∈ E:∃m s.t. (m e) ∈ NE(M g θ)}.22
On the other hand, the “if” direction of Corollary 2 is quite surprising because it
implies that given n ≥ 3 and an economic environment, making evidence alienable is
of no beneﬁt to the planner. To understand why, assume f has a costless extension
ˆ f = (f  ˆ e),w h e r eˆ e(·) is single-valued. Consider the canonical mechanism presented
in Maskin (1999) that would be used to implement ˆ f on the extended outcome space,
assuming n ≥ 3 and that ˆ f satisﬁes standard no veto power on the extended outcome
space (which is ensured by an economic environment). This mechanism gives each
agent i a cheap-talk message space ˆ Mi :=   × A × E × N and has an outcome function
ˆ g: ˆ M1 ×···× ˆ Mn → A × E. The key observation is that because agents’ preferences do
notdependonotheragents’evidence,itispossibletoreducethemessagespaceforeach
agent i to ˆ M 
i :=  ×A×Ei ×N and use an outcome function ˆ g : ˆ M 
1 ×···× ˆ M 
n → A×E
that is consistent with ˆ g except that in Rules 2 and 3, when “rewarding” a deviator
i, ˆ g  chooses for any j  = i the evidence that he has announced, and similarly when
not rewarding a deviator in Rule 2, ˆ g  can choose for him the evidence he has an-
nounced.23 This modiﬁed mechanism always chooses an evidence for each agent that
21An extended social choice rule ˆ f :  ⇒ A×E satisﬁes standard no veto power provided that for all θ,
if (a e) is such that
  
   
 
i : (a ei) ∈ argmax
a  e 
i
Ui(a  e 
i θ)
  
    ≥ n−1
 
  then (a e) ∈ ˆ f(θ) 
22This argument actually shows an alternate proof of Theorem 1 as a corollary of Theorem 4:i ff is
implementable, it must have a costless extension that is implementable on the extended outcome space,
hence the costless extension must be Maskin-monotonic on the extended outcome space, and hence by
Theorem 4, f must be evidence-monotonic.
23Note that one has to make a small and obvious modiﬁcation to the deﬁnition of Rule 2, since the mes-
sage spaces are no longer identical across agents.Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) Implementation with evidence 341
he has announced, hence even if evidence were inalienable, every equilibrium at any
state θ would result in an outcome f(θ)and some costless evidence proﬁle, i.e., we have
achieved implementation with inalienable evidence. Indeed, given that ˆ e(·) is single-
valued by hypothesis here, this is precisely the mechanism used in proving Theorem 2.
Corollary 2 provides additional insight as to why the economic environment condi-
tion in Theorem2 cannotbeweakenedtotheSCFthatsatisﬁes novetopower. By Corol-
lary 2, what is sufﬁcient to implement a SCF f that is evidence-monotonic (given n ≥ 3)
is the existence of a costless extension that satisﬁes standard no veto power on the ex-
tendedoutcomespace. This is amoredemanding requirementthan f satisfying no veto
power. It is this gap that drives Example 4:t h eS C Ff deﬁned there has a unique costless
extension ˆ f given by ˆ f(X)= (b x) and ˆ f(Y)= (c x). While f satisﬁes no veto power,
ˆ f does not satisfy standard no veto power on the extended outcome space because in
state Y, (c y) is top-ranked by players 2 and 3 but involves costly evidence for player 1.
Suchagapisnotspecial;rather,itistobeexpectedinnoneconomicenvironments,even
when preferences are separable.24
The following example shows that the equivalence identiﬁed in Corollary 2 fails
without the assumption of an economic environment.
Example 5. Assume   ={ θ1 θ2} and n = 3, but only player 1 has non-cheap-talk ev-
idence, so we ignore the evidence of players 2 and 3. Evidence is hard evidence with
E1 ={ x y1 y2}, E 
1(θ1) ={ x y1},a n dE 
1(θ2) ={ x y2}. Additionally assume A ={ a1 a2}
and all players have identical preferences over outcomes such that they both strictly
prefer a1 to a2 in state θ1 while they both strictly prefer a2 to a1 in state θ2.T h eS C Ff is
given by f(θ1) = a2 and f(θ2) = a1.
It is straightforward that f cannot be implemented: given any mechanism (M g),
pick any message proﬁle m.W em u s th a v eg(m x)∈{ a1 a2}.I fg(m x)= a1,t h e n(m x)
would be an undesirable Nash equilibrium at state θ1;i fg(m x)= a2,t h e n(m x) would
be an undesirable Nash equilibrium at state θ2.
Now consider the costless extension of f, ˆ f deﬁned by ˆ f(θ1) = (a2 y1) and ˆ f(θ2) =
(a1 y2). On the extended outcome space, ˆ f can be implemented by just asking player 1
to send a cheap-talk direct message about the state and choosing (a2 y1) if he reports θ1
while choosing (a1 y2) if he reports θ2. Notice that ˆ f does not satisfy standard no veto
power on the extended outcome space; indeed, there is no costless extension of f that
does.25 ♦
24Fix a noneconomic environment. Then for some θ, a, e, and J ⊆ I with |J|=n − 1,w eh a v et h a t
∀i ∈ J:(a ei) ∈ argmaxb e 
i Ui(b e 
i θ).W i t h o u t l o s s , l e t n/ ∈ J.A s l o n g a s n has some costly evidence at θ
given outcome a (i.e., E 
n(a θ)  = En), no costless extension of f can satisfy standard no veto power on the
extended outcome space.
25In this example, f can be implemented with inalienable evidence if the planner is allowed to forbid
evidence, just by prohibiting player 1 from submitting evidence x. This observation suggests that the gap
between implementation with alienable evidence and inalienable evidence can be narrowed even further
than Corollary 2 if the planner has the ability to forbid some evidence when evidence is inalienable. We
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5. Hard evidence
In a variety of contexts, many models assume that players can partially prove the state
of the world by providing evidence. We now study how our general results yield par-
ticular insights for implementation in such environments. We assume throughout this
section that the setting is hard evidence as formalized in Deﬁnition 2:e a c hp l a y e ri’s
preferences are separable and represented by ui(a θ) − ci(ei θ), and in any state of the
world, θ, any piece of evidence, ei, has a zero cost for player i (i.e., ci(ei θ)= 0)o ra
sufﬁciently large cost (i.e., ci(ei θ)>supaui(a θ) − infaui(a θ)). Plainly, player i never
submits evidence that is not costless at the true state, and thus evidence ei is proof of
the event {θ:ei ∈ E 
i (θ)}.26 Without loss, we say that the set of evidence a player i has at
stateθ is E 
i (θ)—justhiscostlessevidence—andtheentireevidencestructureisgivenby
{E 
i (θ)}i θ. In addition, when referring to a player’s preferences in this section, we always
mean outcome preferences, since together with the evidence structure, this contains all
relevant information about preferences over the joint space of outcomes and evidence.
5.1 A characterization of evidence monotonicity
Webeginbyprovidinganalternativecharacterizationofevidencemonotonicityforhard
evidence. This characterization is useful because it (partially) disentangles the role of
hard evidence from that of preferences over outcomes in satisfying evidence mono-
tonicity.
Proposition 2. In a hard-evidence setting, a SCF is evidence-monotonic if and only if
there exists e∗:  → E such that
(i) for all θ, e∗(θ) ∈ E (θ) and
(ii) for all θ and θ ,i f
∀i a:
 










i (θ ) ⊆ E 





then f(θ)= f(θ ).
Compared to the deﬁnition of evidence monotonicity, the difference in the charac-
terization above is that (2) has been replaced by the conjunction of (*)a n d( **). Notice
that(*)istheusualconditioninMaskinmonotonicitythatrefersonlytopreferencesover
outcomes. Thismakesittransparentthatevidencemonotonicityinahard-evidenceset-
ting is a generalization of Maskin monotonicity: without (**), it would reduce to Maskin
monotonicity, whereas the presence of (**) makes it a weaker requirement.27
26Indeed,withhardevidence,onecouldworkdirectlywiththe“proofstructure”inducedbytheevidence
structure; to preserve continuity of notation and exposition, we do not do so.
27Since a hard-evidence setting is one of separable preferences, this is also implied by Proposition 1;t h e
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Proposition 2 says that for a SCF f to be evidence-monotonic, one must ﬁnd a func-
tion e∗(·) such that condition (**)i sfalsiﬁed for every ordered pair of states (θ θ ) over
which f violates Maskin monotonicity (i.e., for which f(θ) = f(θ ) but (*)i ss a t i s ﬁ e d ) .
Plainly, this is not possible unless some player’s evidence set varies across such a pair
of states. Fix some e∗(·) and a pair of states θ and θ  such that f(θ) = f(θ ).I f f(θ)
does not go down in any agent’s preference ordering when the state changes from θ to
θ  (i.e., condition (*) is satisﬁed), then we know from Maskin (1999) that to implement f,
a mechanism has to exploit evidence. Condition (**) says that for this to be possible,
either (i) the evidence proﬁle being submitted at θ, e∗(θ), is not available at θ  (negating
t h eﬁ r s tp a rto f( **)) or (ii) some player must have evidence at θ  that is not available at θ,
and outcome f(θ)should not be this player’s most preferred outcome at θ  (together,
negating thesecond partof(**)). Thelatterpreferencerequirementis essential, because
otherwise a player cannot be given incentives to disprove θ when the true state is θ  and
he has the ability to submit evidence supporting θ; this is why the requirement enters
only in the second part of (**) and not the ﬁrst part.
The existential quantiﬁer over e∗(·) in Proposition 2 raises the possibility that it may
betedioustoverify whetheragiven SCFisevidence-monotonic. Subsequently, weshow
how the task can be simpliﬁed in particular domains. For now, let us note that, loosely
speaking, one should choose e∗(θ) to be an evidence proﬁle that is “most informative”
about state θ with respect to the other states that cause a problem for Maskin mono-
tonicity. Inparticular, ifthereisanevidenceproﬁleinstate θ thatprovesmoreaboutthe
state than any other evidence proﬁle available at θ,t h e no n ec a nt a k ee∗(θ) to be this
evidence proﬁle. The idea can be illustrated by returning to the ﬁrst motivating example
of the Introduction, as follows.
Example 6. A principal is concerned with dividing a ﬁxed sum of money, say M>0,
to agents as some function of their individual production. The outcome space is
A ={ (a1     an) ∈ Rn
+:
 
iai ≤ M}.A s t a t e θ is a vector of units of output, i.e., θ =
(θ1     θn) ∈   = Rn
+. Each agent can show his true output or some subset of it,
hence an agent is unable to claim that his output is greater than it in fact is, but he
can claim that it is less. Formally, Ei =   and E 
i (θ) =[ 0 θi] for all i θ. Assume that
ui((a1     an) θ) is strictly increasing in ai.
For any SCF f,w r i t ef(θ)=: (f1(θ)     fn(θ)). It follows that any SCF f that satis-
ﬁes ∀i θ:fi(θ) < M is evidence-monotonic. To see this, ﬁx any such f.F o r a n y θ,l e t
e∗(θ) = θ. It sufﬁces to argue that for any θ   = θ, condition (**)i sv i o l a t e d .I fθ   = θ,t h e r e
exists an agent i such that θ 
i  = θi.F i r s t ,i fθ 
i <θ i,t h e ne∗
i (θ) = θi / ∈[ 0 θ 
i]=E 
i (θ ) and so
t h eﬁ r s tp a r to f( **) is violated. Second, if θ 
i >θ i,t h e nθ 
i ∈ E 
i (θ ) but θ 
i / ∈[ 0 θi]=E 
i (θ),
hence E 
i (θ )   E 
i (θ).M o r e o v e r ,f(θ)/ ∈ argmaxaui(a θ ) because fi(θ) < M. Therefore,
the second part of (**) is violated. ♦
The next example illustrates how the characterization in Proposition 2 can be ap-
plied and also provides more insight into the different elements of condition (**).
Example7. Letn = 4,   ={ θ1 θ2 θ3 θ4},a n dA ={ w x y z}. Player1’s evidencestruc-
ture is given by E 
1(θ1) ={ α β}, E 
1(θ2) ={ α β}, E 
1(θ3) ={ α},a n dE 
1(θ4) ={ α}. All other344 Kartik and Tercieux Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
players have no evidence (i.e., for i>1, E 
i (θ) is constant across θ), so with some abuse
of notation we ignore their evidence below. The (ordinal) preferences of players 1 and 2
aregiveninthelefttablebelow,whilethoseofplayers3and4aregivenintherighttable.










So, for example, u1(w θ1)>u 1(x θ1)>u 1(y θ1)>u 1(z θ1).
(i) Consider the SCF f,w h e r ef(θ1) = f(θ4) = x and f(θ2) = f(θ3) = y. Since
E (θ3) = E (θ4) ={ α},a n ye∗(·) that veriﬁes evidence monotonicity satisﬁes
e∗(θ3) = e∗(θ4) = α. Since no player’s preferences change between states θ3 and
θ4, both (*)a n d( **) are satisﬁed for θ = θ3 and θ  = θ4.H e n c ef is not evidence-
monotonic and, by Theorem 1, not implementable.
(ii) Next consider the SCF f∗,w h e r ef∗(θ1) = x and f∗(θ2) = f∗(θ3) = f∗(θ4) = y.
Even though f∗ is not Maskin-monotonic (because f∗(θ1)  = f∗(θ3) while prefer-
encesdonotchangebetweenstatesθ1 andθ3),onecancheckthatf∗ isevidence-
monotonic by using e∗(θ1) = e∗(θ2) = β and e∗(θ3) = e∗(θ4) = α in Proposition 2.
Note that f∗(θ1) = x is not top-ranked for any agent in state θ3 and f(θ3) = y is
not top-ranked for any agent in state θ1; this is essential to the violation of (**)
for θ = θ3 and θ  = θ1. Furthermore, f∗ satisﬁes no veto power because no alter-
native is top-ranked in any state by more than two players. Since f∗ is evidence-
monotonic, it is implementable by Theorem 3.
(iii) Finally, consider the SCF ˜ f,w h e r e ˜ f(θ1) = x and ˜ f(θ2) = ˜ f(θ3) = ˜ f(θ4) = w.C o n -
sider θ = θ3 and θ  = θ1. Since no player’s preferences change between θ1 and
θ3,( *) is satisﬁed. Since we must have e∗(θ3) = α,h e n c ee∗(θ3) ∈ E (θ1),t h eﬁ r s t
part of (**) is also satisﬁed. The second part of (**) is trivially satisﬁed for all i>1
(theyhavenoevidence);itisalsosatisﬁedforplayer1becausew istop-rankedfor
him in all states. Thus, (**) is satisﬁed and ˜ f is not evidence-monotonic, hence
not implementable. The problem here is that even though E 
1(θ3)   E 
1(θ1),i ti s
not possible to reward player 1 in state θ1 for disproving θ3,b e c a u s e ˜ f(θ3) = w is
player 1’s most preferred outcome in state θ1. ♦
5.2 Evidence monotonicity and distinguishability
Proposition 2 makes no assumption on preferences, the SCF, or the evidence structure
(beyond a hard-evidence setting). We now discuss how the characterization can be con-
siderably simpliﬁed. The key is to completely disentangle properties of the evidence
structure from properties of outcome preferences in verifying evidence monotonicity.
In general, condition (**) shows that these are inextricably linked, so some domain re-
striction is needed for this approach. The following condition of nonsatiation proves
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Definition 7 (Nonsatiation). A SCF f satisﬁes nonsatiation if for all i, θ,a n d
a ∈
 
θ  f(θ ),t h e r ee x i s t s˜ a such that ui(˜ a θ) > ui(a θ).
Intuitively, if a SCF satisﬁes nonsatiation, it is always possible to reward players. For
example, nonsatiation is satisﬁed if there is a divisible private good that is positively
valued by players and the SCF never allocates all of the private good to any player.28 The
important implication is that if f satisﬁes nonsatiation, the preference requirement in
condition (**) can be ignored because the requirement is satisﬁed independently of the
evidence structure. Hence, under nonsatiation, Proposition 2 holds if we replace (**)
with the following weaker condition that depends only on the evidence structure:
e∗(θ) ∈ E (θ ) and E (θ ) ⊆ E (θ)  (***)
Plainly, nonsatiation is essential for this reduction. This can be seen by returning
to the SCF ˜ f in Example 7. Condition (***)i sf a l s i ﬁ e df o rθ  = θ1 and θ = θ3 because
E (θ1)   E (θ3). But, as argued in the example, ˜ f is not evidence-monotonic and thus
not implementable: ˜ f does not satisfy nonsatiation.
Since nonsatiation allows us to completely separate the roles of preferences and ev-
idence structure in evidence monotonicity (respectively captured by (*)a n d( ***)), the
remainder of this section derives a number of simpliﬁcations and implications of evi-
dence monotonicity within the domain of SCF’s that satisfy nonsatiation.
A central question is what hard evidence structures permit non-Maskin-monotonic
SCF’s to be implemented. We provide a sharp answer by introducing a notion of distin-
guishability. Recall that an ordered pair of states (θ θ ) violates Maskin monotonicity if
f(θ) = f(θ ) but (*) is satisﬁed. For any θ,d e ﬁ n e
Tf(θ) :=
 
θ  ∈  :(θ θ ) violates Maskin monotonicity
 
 
In other words, given that the planner wishes to implement the outcome f(θ)in state θ,
Tf(θ) is the set of states that causes a problem for implementation of f in the absence
of evidence. In particular, f is implementable without evidence only if
 
θ∈ Tf(θ) = ∅.
Naturally, to implement f in a setting with evidence, θ and Tf(θ) should be appropri-
ately “distinguishable” using evidence. This notion is made precise by the following def-
inition.
Definition 8 (Distinguishability). For any θ and   ⊆  , θ and   are distinguishable if
for any    ⊆  , E (θ)  =
 
θ ∈   E (θ ).
Thus, a state θ is distinguishable from an event or set of states   if for every sub-
set    of  , either some player can disprove    when θ is the true state (which requires
E 
i (θ)  
 
θ ∈   E 
i (θ )) or some player can disprove θ when the true state state is in   
28Recall that the environment is economic if there is a divisible private good that is positively valued by
all players. Nonsatiation further requires that the SCF be such that no player receives all of the private good
in any state. More generally, nonsatiation does not imply an economic environment, but the conjunction
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(which requires E 
i (θ)  
 
θ ∈   E 
i (θ )). Notice that if θ is distinguishable from  ,t h e n
θ is distinguishable from any subset of  . Consequently, if θ and   are distinguishable,
then θ must be “pairwise distinguishable” from every θ  ∈   (in particular, θ/ ∈  ). How-
ever, such pairwise distinguishability need not be enough for distinguishability. The fol-
lowing example illustrates this point and also shows how distinguishability is connected
to evidence monotonicity and implementability.
Example 8. There are two propositions: a and b.E a c hm e m b e ro fag r o u po ft h r e eo r
more experts knows which of the two propositions are true, if any. Due to time or space
limitations, however, each one can provide a proof of at most one proposition. This
problemcanberepresentedby  ={ ϕ a b ab},andforalli, E 
i (ϕ) ={ ϕ}, E 
i (a) ={ ϕ a},
E 
i (b) ={ ϕ b},andE 
i (ab) ={ ϕ a b},wher eϕrepresents“neitherpropositionistrue”or
“no proof provided.”
Suppose now that the experts’ preferences over outcomes are state-independent, so
that (*) is always satisﬁed. Then, for any choice of {e∗
i (ab)}n
i=1,t h e r ee x i s t sθ  ∈{ a b}
such that (**) is satisﬁed with θ = ab. It follows from Proposition 2 that not every SCF
is evidence-monotonic, and hence that not every SCF is implementable. In particu-
lar, implementability requires f(ab)∈{ f(a) f(b)}. In the other direction, by choosing
e∗
i (ϕ) = ϕ, e∗
i (a) = a,a n de∗
i (b) = b,w es e et h a tf(ab)∈{ f(a) f(b)} is also sufﬁcient for
the SCF f to falsify (***) and thus for f to be implementable under no veto power and
nonsatiation.
Hence, although this evidence structure satisﬁes “pairwise distinguishability” (i.e.,
θ  = θ   ⇒ E(θ)  = E (θ )), evidence monotonicity is not guaranteed even under non-
satiation. The reason is that although state ab is distinguishable from any other state
θ ∈{ ϕ a b}, state ab is not distinguishable from the event {ϕ a b} because of the as-
sumption that an expert can provide a proof of at most one proposition.29 ♦
The following result characterizes evidence monotonicity in terms of distinguisha-
bility.
Proposition 3. Assume f satisﬁes nonsatiation. Then f is evidence-monotonic if and
only if for all θ, θ and Tf(θ) are distinguishable.
AnimmediateimplicationofProposition3isthatasimpleconditionontheevidence
structure guarantees that any SCF that satisﬁes nonsatiation is evidence-monotonic, no
matter what the agents’ preferences are:
∀θ:θ is distinguishable from  \{θ}  (UD)
Condition (UD), short for universal distinguishability, requires that each state must
be distinguishable from any event that does not contain it. As seen in Example 8,t h i s
is generally a stronger requirement than every state being distinguishable from every
other state.
29If each expert could prove both a and b when the two statements are both true, then E 
i (ab) would be
augmented by ab, in which case the state ab would be distinguishable from the event {ϕ a b} and any SCF
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Corollary 3. Assume n ≥ 3. Any SCF that satisﬁesboth novetopower and nonsatiation
can be implemented if (UD)h o l d s .
Proof.L e tf be an arbitrary SCF that satisﬁes nonsatiation and no veto power. Pick
any θ. Since θ/ ∈ Tf(θ),( UD)i m p l i e st h a tθ is distinguishable from Tf(θ).B yProposi-
tion 3, f is evidence-monotonic. Theorem 3 yields the desired conclusion.  
Corollary 3 is tight in the sense that if (UD) is violated, there exists a proﬁle of utility
functions (for n ≥ 3) and a SCF that satisﬁes no veto power and nonsatiation such that
the SCF is not implementable. We illustrate Corollary 3 with the following example.
Example 9. Let   ={ θ1 θ2 θ3}, n = 3,a n dl e tE 
1(θ1) ={ x y}, E 
1(θ2) ={ x}, E 
1(θ3) =
{y}, E 
2(θ1) ={ x y}, E 
2(θ2) ={ y}, E 
2(θ3) ={ x},a n dE 
3(θ) ={ z} for all θ.T h e n ( UD)
holds because E (θ1) ={ (x x z) (x y z) (y x z) (y y z)}, E (θ2) ={ (x y z)},a n d
E (θ3) ={ (y x z)}.H e n c e ,b yCorollary3, any SCFthatsatisﬁes no veto power and non-
satiation is implementable. ♦
Many models with hard evidence, both in mechanism design and beyond, assume
that the structure of hard evidence satisﬁes a property known as normality, which cap-
tures the idea that agents face no constraints on time, effort, space, etc. in providing
evidence.30 The formal deﬁnition follows.
Definition 9 (Normality). The evidence structure is normal or satisﬁes normality if for
all i and θ,t h e r ei ss o m e¯ ei(θ) ∈ E 
i (θ) such that [¯ ei(θ) ∈ E 
i (θ )  ⇒ E 
i (θ) ⊆ E 
i (θ )].
The formulation above follows Bull and Watson (2007). It says that for any player i
andstate θ,thereissomeevidence ¯ ei(θ) thatcanbeinterpretedasmaximalorsummary
evidence because it proves by itself what agent i could prove by jointly sending all his
available evidence. The condition is equivalent to the full reports condition of Lipman
and Seppi (1995)o rt h eminimal closure condition of Forges and Koessler (2005), and is
somewhatweakerthanGreenand Laffont’s (1986)nestedrangeconditionintheir“direct
mechanism” setting.31
To illustrate the property, consider Example 6 again, where   = Rn
+, Ei =  ,a n d
E 
i (θ) =[ 0 θi] for all i θ. This evidence structure is seen to be normal by setting
¯ ei(θ) = θi for all i, θ:i f¯ ei(θ) = θi ∈ E 
i (θ ) =[ 0 θ 
i],t h e ni tm u s tb et h a tθi ≤ θ 
i and so
E 
i (θ) =[ 0 θi]⊆[ 0 θ 
i]=E 
i (θ ), as required. It is straightforward to also check that Ex-
ample 7 satisﬁes normality, whereas Example 8 does not.
30Exceptions include Bull and Watson (2007), Glazer and Rubinstein (2001, 2004, 2006), Lipman and
Seppi (1995), and Sher (2010).
31Green and Laffont (1986)t a k eEi =   and assume that θ ∈ E 
i (θ). The nested range condition says
that if θ  ∈ E 
i (θ) and θ   ∈ E 
i (θ ),t h e nθ   ∈ E 
i (θ). This implies normality because for all i and and θ,o n e
can set ¯ ei(θ) = θ. To see that normality is strictly weaker, consider the example   ={ θ1 θ2 θ3}:f o ra l li,
E 
i (θ1) ={ θ1 θ2} and E 
i (θ2) = E 
i (θ3) ={ θ2 θ3}. Normality is veriﬁed by choosing, for all i, ¯ ei(θ1) = θ1 and
¯ ei(θ2) = ¯ ei(θ3) = θ3. By contrast, the nested range condition is violated because for all i, θ2 ∈ E 
i (θ1) yet
θ3 ∈ E 
i (θ2) and θ3 / ∈ E 
i (θ1).348 Kartik and Tercieux Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
For SCF’s that satisfy nonsatiation, normality implies that the characterization
in Proposition 2 can be signiﬁcantly simpliﬁed: a SCF that satisﬁes nonsatiation is
evidence-monotonic if and only if for all θ and θ ,i f( *)a n d
E (θ) = E (θ ) (5)
hold, then f(θ)= f(θ ).
The reason is that under normality, no matter what e∗(·) is, (***)i se q u i v a l e n tt o( 5).
Thus the existential qualiﬁer in Proposition 2 can be dropped altogether.
A related observation is that when the evidence structure is normal, distinguisha-
bility of any state θ and event   is equivalent to the distinguishability of θ from each
θ  ∈  .32 Combining this with Proposition 3 yields the following corollary.
Corollary4. Assumetheevidencestructureisnormal. ASCFthatsatisﬁesnonsatiation
is evidence-monotonic if and only if for any θ and θ  ∈ Tf(θ), E (θ)  = E (θ ).
Corollary 4 identiﬁes exactly which normal evidence structures permit implemen-
tation of non-Maskin-monotonic SCF’s (under n ≥ 3, nonsatiation, and no veto power).
It can be combined with our earlier results to derive additional corollaries, such as that
which follows.
Corollary 5. Assume n ≥ 3 and that the evidence structure is normal. A SCF f that
satisﬁes both no veto power and nonsatiation is implementable if
∀θ θ :[E (θ) = E (θ )  ⇒ f(θ)= f(θ )]  (6)
Remark 3. Ben-Porath and Lipman (2011) study implementation with hard evidence.
They refer to condition (6) as “measurability” and show in their Proposition 1 that in
this setting, a SCF is implementable when preferences are state-independent only if it
satisﬁes (6). Our Proposition 2 in fact implies a stronger necessary condition for im-








i (θ) = E 
i (θ ) or (f(θ) ∈ argmaxaui(a θ ) and E 




To verify this, observe ﬁrst that under state-independent preferences, (*)i ss a t i s -
ﬁed for all θ and θ ; second, if the conditional in (7) holds for some θ and θ ,t h e nn o r -
mality implies that (**) is satisﬁed regardless of the choice of e∗(·) (in particular, when
e∗(θ) = ¯ e(θ) for all θ).
Condition (7)i so b v i o u s l ys t r o n g e rt h a n( 6) and emphasizes the necessity of being
able to reward players for evidence submission. Under nonsatiation, the two conditions
32To see this, ﬁx θ and   ⊆  , and assume that ∀θ  ∈  :E (θ)  = E (θ ). Suppose, per contra, that for
some    ⊆  :E (θ) =
 
θ ∈   E (θ ).T h e nf o ra l lθ  ∈   , ¯ e(θ ) ∈ E (θ) (where ¯ e is from the deﬁnition of nor-
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are equivalent. Ben-Porath and Lipman (2011) also independently prove a result similar
toCorollary5. Notethatevenundernormality,nonsatiationandnovetopower,(6)isnot
necessaryforimplementationwhenpreferencesarenotstate-independent,forinstance
the SCF f∗ in Example 7. The reason is that when hard evidence is the same across
two states, a mechanism can still exploit preference reversals to implement different
outcomes, just as in the standard environment without evidence.
6. Conclusion
This paper generalizes the implementation problem to incorporate agents’ ability to
provide discriminatory signals or evidence about the state. The central theme of our
results is that the planner can use either agents’ preferences over outcomes or their evi-
dentiary technology to discriminate between states of the world, even though evidence
submission is inalienable. We study both hard evidence, where players can prove that
the state lies in some subset of all possible states, and the costly production of evidence,
where evidentiary costs are nonprohibitive but vary across states. The results we obtain
may be useful in terms of both necessary conditions—in particular, the ﬁnding that the
ability to reward players is sometimes needed—and sufﬁcient conditions that demon-
strate how a wide class of social choice functions are implementable as a function of the
evidence structure. In particular, we identify an appropriate generalization and weak-
ening of Maskin monotonicity—evidence monotonicity—and show that this is the key
to implementation with evidence.
There are a number of directions in which this research can be developed. Our anal-
ysis here substantially exploits the complete-information setting, and it is obviously im-
portant to understand how the arguments can be extended when agents have private
information. We conjecture that a weakening of Jackson’s (1991) Bayesian monotonicity
condition in a manner similar to how evidence monotonicity weakens Maskin mono-
tonicity will be central to Bayesian implementation, in conjunction with standard con-
ditions like incentive compatibility.
Within the complete-information framework, it would also be useful to understand
how evidence changes the implementation problem when attention is restricted to
“nice” mechanisms, for example, “bounded mechanisms” (Jackson 1992). In a related
vein, the presence of evidence generally allows greater scope for implementation with
weaker solution concepts, such as in dominant strategies. These are likely to be fruitful
avenues for further study.
Finally, we note that our notion of implementation in this paper is that no eviden-
tiarycostsshouldbeincurredinequilibrium. Thisiswithoutlossofgeneralityinahard-
evidence setting, but is not when there are nonprohibitive evidentiary costs. For exam-
ple, the literature on screening shows that it may be possible to design a mechanism
that induces information revelation from an agent (in a unique equilibrium) at the cost
of incurring inefﬁcient signaling distortions; this would apply in versions of our Exam-
ple 3. It would be interesting to extend our analysis to full implementation in a general
framework that allows for costly evidence provision in equilibrium.350 Kartik and Tercieux Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
Appendix:O mitted proofs
The following lemma is used in the proof of Theorem 4.
Lemma 1. AS C Ff is evidence-monotonic if and only if there exists a nonempty-valued
correspondence e∗∗:  ⇒ E such that
(i) for all θ, e∗∗(θ) ⊆ E (θ f(θ)),a n d
(ii) for all θ, θ ,a n de ∈ e∗∗(θ),i f
∀i b e 
i:
 
Ui(f(θ) ei θ)≥ Ui(b e 




then f(θ)= f(θ ) and e ∈ e∗∗(θ ).
Notice two differences between the deﬁnition of evidence monotonicity and the
condition given in Lemma 1: ﬁrst, the mapping e∗∗ is a correspondence, whereas the
e∗ in Deﬁnition 4 is a function; second, part (ii) places a requirement on the relationship
between e∗∗(θ) and e∗∗(θ ) that is not required by Deﬁnition 4.
Proof of Lemma 1. The “if” direction is straightforward because any single-valued se-
lection from the correspondence e∗∗(·) in the lemma’s statement veriﬁes Deﬁnition 4.
So consider the “only if” direction. Assume that f is evidence-monotonic. Fix any e∗
that veriﬁes Deﬁnition 4. Deﬁne a binary relation R on  ×  as follows: θRθ  whenever
condition (2)i nDeﬁnition 4 holds, which we reproduce here as




i (θ) θ) ≥ Ui(a e 
i θ)⇒ Ui(f(θ) e∗




Deﬁne the correspondence e∗∗:  ⇒ E as follows: for any θ , e∗∗(θ ) =
 
θ:θRθ  e∗(θ).
Note that because R is reﬂexive, e∗(θ ) ∈ e∗∗(θ ) for any θ .
We show that this correspondence e∗∗(·) satisﬁes the lemma’s requirements. To
check the ﬁrst requirement, pick any e ∈ e∗∗(θ ). By construction, this means that
e = e∗(θ) for some θ such that θRθ . Thus, condition (9) holds, and hence evidence
monotonicity implies that f(θ ) = f(θ). Moreover, by using e 
i = e∗
i (θ ) and a = f(θ)in
condition (9), and the fact that e∗(θ ) ∈ E (θ  f(θ )) = E (θ  f(θ)) (by part (i) of Deﬁni-
tion 4), it follows that e = e∗(θ) ∈ E (θ  f(θ)) = E (θ  f(θ )). Since e was an arbitrary
choice from e∗∗(θ ), it follows that for all θ , e∗∗(θ ) ⊆ E (θ  f(θ )),w h i c hi st h eﬁ r s tr e -
quirement of the lemma.
W en o ws h o wt h a te∗∗(·) also satisﬁes part (ii) of the lemma’s requirements. Pick any
θ, θ ,a n de ∈ e∗∗(θ) that satisfy (8). We must prove that f(θ)= f(θ ) and e ∈ e∗∗(θ ). Note
that since e ∈ e∗∗(θ), there must exist θ   such that e = e∗(θ  ) and θ  Rθ. By deﬁnition
of R,
∀i a e 
i:
 
Ui(f(θ  ) e∗
i (θ  ) θ  ) ≥ Ui(a e 
i θ  )  ⇒ Ui(f(θ  ) e∗




That f is evidence-monotonic implies f(θ  ) = f(θ). Hence, the preceding line is equiv-
alent to




i (θ  ) θ  ) ≥ Ui(a e 
i θ  )  ⇒ Ui(f(θ) e∗
i (θ  ) θ) ≥ Ui(a e 
i θ)
 
  (10)Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) Implementation with evidence 351
Furthermore, from condition (8)a n de = e∗∗(θ  ),w eh a v e




i (θ  ) θ) ≥ Ui(a e 
i θ) ⇒ Ui(f(θ) e∗




Combining (10)a n d( 11) yields




i (θ  ) θ  ) ≥ Ui(a e 
i θ  )  ⇒ Ui(f(θ) e∗




Since f(θ  ) = f(θ), the preceding line is equivalent to θ  Rθ .T h a t f is evidence-
monotonic now implies that f(θ  ) = f(θ ) and so f(θ)= f(θ ). Finally, observe that
since θ  Rθ , the construction of e∗∗(·) implies that e = e∗(θ  ) ∈ e∗∗(θ ).  
Proof of Theorem 4. For the “only if” direction, assume f is evidence-monotonic.
Pick any correspondence e∗∗(·) that satisﬁes the conditions in Lemma 1 and let
ˆ f = (f e∗∗). We show that ˆ f is Maskin-monotonic on the extended outcome space. To
prove this, ﬁx any θ, (a e) ∈ ˆ f(θ),a n dθ . We must show that if
∀i b e :
 
Ui(a ei θ)≥ Ui(b e 




then (a e) ∈ ˆ f(θ ). So assume (12). Then (8) is satisﬁed (since a = f(θ)), hence Lemma 1
implies that f(θ ) = f(θ)and e ∈ e∗∗(θ ), which together imply that (a e) ∈ ˆ f(θ ),a sr e -
quired.
For the “if” direction, suppose ˆ f = (f e∗∗) is a costless extension of f that is Maskin-
monotonic on the extended outcome space. To show that f is evidence-monotonic, it
sufﬁces to show that e∗∗(·) satisﬁes the requirements of Lemma 1. The ﬁrst requirement
of Lemma 1 is obviously satisﬁed by the deﬁnition of a costless extension; to prove the
second, ﬁx θ, θ ,a n de ∈ e∗∗(θ), and assume (8). We must show that f(θ ) = f(θ)and
e ∈ e∗∗(θ ). Condition (8) implies that (12) holds when a = f(θ). Thus, Maskin mono-
tonicity of (f e∗∗) implies that (f(θ) e) ∈ ˆ f(θ ), which implies that f(θ)= f(θ ) and
e ∈ e∗∗(θ ), as required.  
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider the hard-evidence setting, i.e., separable prefer-
ences and for all i, θ,a n dei,e i t h e rci(ei θ)= 0 or ci(ei θ)>supaui(a θ)−infaui(a θ).
First we prove sufﬁciency. For this, it sufﬁces to show that (2)  ⇒ (*)a n d( **). So
assume (2). By considering e 
i = e∗
i (θ) in (2), it is straightforward that (*) follows. For the
ﬁrst part of (**), consider (2)w i t ha = f(θ)and e 
i ∈ E 
i (θ ). Since the antecedent within
(2) is then satisﬁed, the consequent must be true, which yields ci(e∗
i (θ) θ ) ≤ 0,w h i c h
implies e∗
i (θ) ∈ E 
i (θ ).A st h i si st r u ef o ra l li,t h eﬁ r s tp a r to f( **)i ss h o w n .N o wo b s e r v e
that the second part of (**) is equivalent to
∀i:E 
i (θ )   E 
i (θ)  ⇒
 
∀a:ui(f(θ) θ ) ≥ ui(a θ )
 
  (13)
Fix any i. It sufﬁces to show that (13)i ss a t i s ﬁ e d .F o ra n ye 
i ∈ E 
i (θ )\E 
i (θ), it is straight-
forward to check that the antecedent within (2) is always satisﬁed for any a (because
ci(e 
i θ)>supaui(a θ) − infaui(a θ)). Hence, for any a, the consequent of (2)m u s tb e
true, and given that e∗
i (θ) ∈ E 
i (θ ) and e 
i ∈ E 
i (θ )\E 
i (θ), it follows that the consequent
of (13) holds.352 Kartik and Tercieux Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
Next we show necessity. For this it sufﬁces to show that (*)a n d( **)  ⇒ (2). Ac-
cordingly, assume (*)a n d( **), which in particular implies (13)f o ra l li.I f e 
i / ∈ E 
i (θ ),
then ci(e 
i θ )>supaui(a θ )−infaui(a θ ), which combines with the ﬁrst part of (**)t o
imply that (2) is satisﬁed (because the consequent therein holds, regardless of the an-
tecedent). Next, if e 
i ∈ E 
i (θ),t h e nb y( *)a n dt h eﬁ r s tp a r to f( **), it follows that (2)m u s t
hold. Finally, for all e 
i ∈ E 
i (θ ) \ E 
i (θ),( 13) combined with the ﬁrst part of (**)i m p l i e s
that the consequent in (2)i ss a t i s ﬁ e d .  
Proof of Proposition 3. Assume nonsatiation. Recall that we can then replace (**)
by (***)i nProposition 2. It follows from this version of Proposition 2 that f is evidence-
monotonic if and only if
∀θ ∃e∗(θ) ∈ E (θ) s.t. ∀θ  ∈ Tf(θ) ∃i s.t. (e∗
i (θ) / ∈ E 
i (θ )) or (E 
i (θ )   E 
i (θ))  (14)
We work with this equivalent formulation.
For the “if” direction of the result, assume that
∀θ and   ⊆ Tf(θ):E (θ)  =
 
θ ∈ 
E (θ ) (15)
and, toward contradiction, that (14) is false. This implies that there exists θ such that for
all e ∈ E (θ),t h e r ee x i s t sθ (e) ∈ Tf(θ) for which
∀i:(ei ∈ E 
i (θ (e))) and (E 
i (θ (e)) ⊆ E 
i (θ)) 
Set   :=
 
e∈E (θ)θ (e) and note that   ⊆ Tf(θ). Since e ∈ E (θ (e)) for each e ∈ E (θ),i t
follows that E (θ) ⊆
 
θ ∈ E (θ ). Finally, for each e ∈ E (θ),w eh a v eE (θ (e)) ⊆ E (θ),
hence
 
θ ∈ E (θ ) ⊆ E (θ),a n ds oE (θ) =
 
θ ∈ E (θ ), a contradiction to (15).
For the “only if” direction, assume that f satisﬁes (14). We proceed again by con-
tradiction, assuming that for some θ and   ⊆ Tf(θ), E (θ) =
 
θ ∈ E (θ ). This implies
that for some θ,( i )f o ra l le ∈ E (θ),t h e r ee x i s t sθ (e) ∈   ⊆ Tf(θ) such that e ∈ E (θ (e)),
and (ii) E (θ (e)) ⊆ E (θ). But this contradicts the assumption that f satisﬁes (14).  
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